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This thesis explores three aspects of the relationship 
between U.S. news media and the Chinese pro-democracy 
movement in 1989. These three aspects are: How much 
attention did u.s. newspapers give to the Chinese pro-
democracy movement in 1989? How did u.s. newspapers 
portray the power struggle in the Chinese government during 
the time when the Chinese pro-democracy movement took place? 
Has there been any change in the image of China during and 
after the Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989? 
Research data are drawn from the following three u.s. 
newspapers: The New York Times, Washington Post, and Los 
Angeles Times. 
Content analysis is adopted as the research method in 
this study. This research method is carried out in three 
parts targeting the three research questions mentioned 
above. The first part shows the total front-page space and 
number of news stories in the three u.s. newspapers. The 
front-page space and number of news stories in each 
newspaper is utilized to measure the degree of attention 
that each newspaper gave to the Chinese pro-democracy 
movement in 1989. The second part illustrates the power 
struggle in the Chinese government. Top Chinese officials 
are presented as either losing or gaining power based on 
the treatment they received from the three u.s. newspapers. 
The third part demonstrates the change in the image of 
China during and after the Chinese pro-democracy movement 
in 1989. Both positive and negative changes in the image 
of China are determined by the use of ideological and non-
ideological symbolic representations of China in news 
stories. 
Research findings on the first research question show 
that both front-page space and number of news stories 
related to events in China increased dramatically in all 
three u.s. newspapers. Research findings on the power 
struggle in the Chinese government showed that, in general, 
all three u.s. newspapers viewed the three top Chinese 
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officials as losing power before military troops were used 
to control the situation in Beijing on June 4, 1989. 
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Finally, research findings showed a negative change in the 
image of China during and the Chinese pro-democracy movement, 
especially after the Chinese government regained control of 
Tiananmen Square by using military force on June 4, 1989. 
Implications for future research in mass communication 
are discussed and, finally, the thesis concludes with 
suggestions for further research in mass media and 
communication. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
THE CHINESE PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN 1989 
China embarked on the road of economic reform at the 
end of the 1970s. The experiment of economic reform brought 
about dramatic changes in every aspect of Chinese society. 
on the positive side, the increase in grain output from 1978 
to 1984 was greater than the output realized in the 
preceding 20 years (1958-1977). Increases in personal 
incomes since 1978 have been greater than in the entire 
period from 1949 to 1977. On the negative side, inflation 
and corruption in government agencies became rampant. 
Embezzlement and bribery were no longer unusual in people's 
daily lives. 
Dissatisfaction in society turned into public outcry 
when the reformist leader Hu Yaobang died on April 15, 1989. 
The initial stage of the movement was demonstrations led by 
university students in Beijing who indirectly praised Hu 
Yaobang for his open tolerance of different opinions and 
criticized those who brought him down after the 1986-1987 
student demonstrations in Beijing and Shanghai. Big posters 
were first posted in universities in Beijing and soon spread 
all over the capital. The demonstrators demanded a stop to 
corruption and reform of the political system and the 
economic system. 
In early May, 1989, in observance of the May 4th 
Movement, students in a dozen cities responded to the call 
from the Beijing students and took to the street to express 
their dissatisfaction and demands. The movement rapidly 
spread over all the country. 
The movement escalated after the demonstrators' attempt 
to have an equal and direct dialogue with the government 
failed. Three thousand hunger strikers began their sit-in 
protest in Tiananmen Square. The student movement won over 
sympathy and support from ordinary citizens all over the 
country. In a short period of time, from late April to mid-
May, 1989, people from all walks of life got involved in the 
movement. 
Along with escalation of the demonstrations rose the 
demands of the demonstrators. The demands included 
resignation of top leaders of government and the communist 
party, release of all political prisoners, and freedom of 
the press. At this point, the demonstrations changed into a 
large-scale mass movement which was unprecedented since the 
Chinese communists took power in mainland China in 1949. 
When international news media focused their attention 
on Gorbachev's visit to Beijing in May, 1989, they found 
that the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years was 
overshadowed by the pro-democracy movement. Tens of 
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thousands of demonstrators occupied the center of the 
capital asking for more freedom and democracy. Gorbachev's 
welcoming ceremony had to be moved from Tiananmen Square to 
the airport. For Chinese leaders, it was a great loss of 
face. 
For more than six weeks the demonstrators occupied 
Beijing's Tiananmen Square, wnich is the symbol of the 
communist establishment in China. And for the first time in 
its 40-year rule, the communist party lost control of the 
capital. 
The fact that there was a time in May 1989 
when the government of China was overthrown as 
the real controlling authority will become 
part of China's history and is certain to 
affect China's future (Rosenthal, 1989). 
People from all walks of life took part in 
demonstrations. Following students' independent 
organizations, workers and journalists established their own 
independent unions. Fearing the possibility of unbearable 
consequences of the mass movement, the Chinese government 
declared martial law in Beijing on May 20, 1989. 
Over one million people in the capital were galvanized 
by the declaration of martial law in Beijing. Beijing 
citizens took to the street and built roadblocks to prevent 
army troops from entering the city center. The army troops 
were either persuaded to leave or were pushed out of the 
city center more than once. On more than one occasion, the 
martial law seemed to be nullified by the people's power. 
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The stalement lasted nearly two weeks until the Chinese 
government used military troops to regain control of the 
capital by force on June 4, 1989. 
NEWS MEDIA and POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 
According to Bond (1967), "It is the primary function 
of newspapers to communicate to the human race what its 
members do, feel, and think" (p.5). This function of news 
media is vital in modern societies. People in modern 
societies rely on news media to survive. As Bond (1967) 
stated: 
Life has become so complex and its interests 
so manifold that even the specialists become 
baffled in their own fields of knowledge. The 
ordinary mortal caught in a maze of ecnonmics, 
science or invention needs to be led by the 
hand through its intricacies (p.6). 
A similar point was further made clear by Gitlin when 
he said: 
... people find themselves relying on the media 
for concepts, for images of their heroes, for 
guiding information, for emotional charges, 
for a recognition of public values, for 
symbols in general, even for language .... mass 
media are, to say the least, a significant 
social force in the forming and delimiting of 
public assumptions, attitudes, and moods -- of 
ideology, in short (Gitlin, 1980, p.1-9). 
In other words, news media have the power to influence 
people in formulating their opinions, making their 
decisions, and taking sides when they face disputing social 
issues. 
Political movements, as one type of social activity, 
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also depend on news media to send their messages to the 
public. Gitlin (1980) discussed the function of news media 
in political movements when he said that news media present 
any given political movement to the public regarding what 
the movement is and what purposes the movement intends to 
fulfill. To accomplish a certain goal, a political movement 
has to rely on large-scale communication means to reach and 
to mobilize the public. 
The Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989 is an 
important social and political movement in contemporary 
Chinese history. It had tremendous impact on u.s.-china 
relations. How was the movement perceived by the American 
public? How was the movement presented to the American 
public by u.s. news media? Answers to these initial 
questions of interest became the driving force for the 
present study. 
THE U.S. NEWS MEDIA 
In Four Theories Of The Press (Siebert, et al, 1976), 
one of the theoretical assumptions is, 
... the press always takes on the form and 
coloration of the social and political 
structures within which it operates. 
Especially, it reflects the system of social 
control whereby the relations of individuals 
and institutions are adjusted (p.l). 
The point is that there is no good or bad press from a 
theoretical perspective. The presses are just different 
from one another. However, the differences between 
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different presses are not just cultural, historical, or 
political. Presses of industrialized and developed 
countries tend to be more influential than those of backward 
and less developed countries. Walker (1983) discussed the 
influence of different newspapers by saying that: 
... one remnant of that world of 1945 still 
dominates much of the earth's intellectual, 
political and cultural life. The newspapers 
of the Grand Alliance have survived, and even 
expanded their influence (p.1). 
After World War II, the United States became the 
leading democracy with its advanced material progress, 
technology, and military strength. Both u.s. domestic and 
foreign policies have strong effects on today's 
international relations. The u.s. newspapers, especially 
big ones like The New York Times and Washington Post, not 
only reflect the u.s. government's policies, but also have 
a great deal of influence on the setting of political 
agendas and the process of policy making. 
Policymakers generally share the view that 
among the most significant impacts of the 
press occur early on the policymaking 
process, when it is not yet clear which issues 
will be addressed and what questions will be 
decided. Officials believe that the media do 
a lot to set the policy agenda and to 
influence how an issue is understood by 
policymakers, interest groups, and the public 
(Linsky, 1986, p.87). 
Pierre Salinger (former President Kennedy's press 
secretary) once stated the importance of big newspapers in 
the United States. He said, 
No top policy-maker in Washington starts his 
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day without reading The New York Times .••. The 
Washington Post derives its importance from 
being read every morning by Washington 
officialdom from the President on down 
(Walker, 1983, p.3). 
The power and influence of the u.s. newspapers make it 
impossible to ignore the importance they carry in the case 
of any social and political movement, home and abroad. 
Therefore, it is meaningful to see how the u.s. newspapers 
portrayed the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement. 
ISSUES IN THIS RESEARCH 
The present research focuses on how some of the major 
u.s. newspapers represented the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy 
movement. Before the movement was suppressed by military 
troops on June 4, 1989, the Chinese pro-democracy movement 
captured the attention of international news media. News 
regarding the Chinese pro-democracy movement got on the 
front pages of all major newspapers for several weeks. The 
Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989 received a great deal 
of attention from the international news media. But exactly 
how much attention did u.s. newspapers give to the movement? 
Front-page space of newspapers is generally used as an 
important measurement to determine how much attention the 
newspapers give to a certain event. 
Therefore, how much front-page space did some of the 
leading u.s. newspapers use to cover the events of the pro-
democracy movement in China? Did some newspapers pay more 
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attention to the movement than others did? Previous 
research provided some clues as to how and why front-page 
coverage could be used to measure the amount of attention 
that each newspaper gave to a given event (for a detailed 
discussion, see Chapter III). 
Another issue is how some of the leading u.s. 
newspapers portrayed the power struggle at the top level of 
the Chinese government and the communist party. How 
accurate were the news reports in their prediction of the 
power struggle in the Chinese government before the military 
troops put an end to the pro-democracy movement on June 4, 
1989? 
This issue carries particular significance in this 
research in that the power struggle was not only part of the 
entire movement, but also a decisive factor that contributed 
to the final ending of the movement. In other words, the 
outcome of the political struggle played a key role in the 
way the Chinese government handled the mass demonstrations 
in early June, 1989. 
The last issue in this research is whether there has 
been any change in the image of China from the perspective 
of u.s. newspapers, during and right after the Chinese pro-
democracy movement in 1989. 
The image of China changed dramatically after Sino-u.s. 
normalization in 1979. Instead of symbolic representations 
like "Communist China" or "Red China," China has more often 
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been referred to as "Mainland China" or simply "China" 
(Chang, 1989). This change in the image of China is 
considered positive because the symbolic representations 
after 1979 are non-hostile and non-ideological. 
Has the pro-democracy movement affected the image of 
China from the perspective of the u.s. news media? If so, 
is the change negative or positive? 
The above three issues are transformed into three 
research questions and on the basis of these issues the 
present study is designed. 
STRUCTURE OF THIS RESEARCH 
This research is composed of five correlated chapters. 
The first chapter is a general introduction to the entire 
project. It offers a short summary of the Chinese pro-
democracy movement in 1989, a brief discussion of the 
relationship between news media and political movements, 
the importance and influence of U.S. newspapers, three 
issues central to this research, and finally, the structure 
of this research. 
Chapter two provides a review of literature in areas 
related to this research. It is a general survey of 
previous research and a theoretical foundation on which this 
research is based. In this chapter, there are three 
sections: a review of research articles from different 
journals, a review of theoretical books, and research 
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questions. 
The third chapter offers a detailed description of the 
research method. In this research, the method is content 
analysis. This chapter consists of four sections: the 
theoretical definition of content analysis, research data, 
coding categories, and the procedure of data collection. 
Chapter four contains research findings and data 
analysis. Specific charts (Tables) are used to illustrate 
details of research findings. Findings in each chart are 
followed by interpretations and analysis. 
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The last chapter presents a general discussion of this 
study, a summary of the research findings, conclusion of the 
research, and implications for future research in this 
field. Limitations of this research are also discussed in 
this chapter. The implication section offers some tentative 
suggestions for future research in this area. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
This research is an attempt to examine how some of the 
leading u.s. newspapers portrayed the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement in China. The literature review provided in this 
chapter focuses on two major areas related to this topic. 
The first part provides a discussion on the substantive 
issues of mass communication. The second is about some 
relevant theoretical issues in the study of news media and 
mass movements. Following the literature review, general 
research questions are posed. At the end of this chapter, 
specific research questions are presented. 
GENERAL ISSUES OF NEWS MEDIA 
What Is News? 
Where does the concept of "news" come from? Edwin 
{1972), in his writing about the history of American 
journalism, said that the word "news" was not commonly used 
until the invention of printing made it possible for the 
masses to see printed periodicals. Instead, before 1500, 
the word "tidings" was usually used to refer to current 
events. In Edwin's words, 
The word "news" was coined to differentiate 
between the casual dissemination of 
information and the deliberate attempt to 
gather and process the latest intelligence 
(p.3). 
From Edwin's writing, we can get a glimpse of the 
notion that news is not raw information in our daily lives. 
News is purposely collected, intentionally filtered, and 
systematically processed information that is intended to 
fulfill certain purposes. This point will be further 
discussed later in the "News Collection" part of 
this chapter. 
Despite the long history of "news," no precise 
definition of "news" has emerged. Even some of the leading 
theorists in this field have to admit that giving a clear 
definition of news is no easy job. Romano (1986) wrote: 
Easy answers, even off-the-cuff ones, don't 
jump to mind .... "news," unlike "Maryland" or 
"pineapple," is a vague word on the cusp 
between the undefined and the 
self-contradictory (p.40). 
In her doctoral dissertation, Fields (1984) discussed 
the concept of news when she quoted Alexander who said that 
news 
... can be understood as a continuous 
processing of raw information that makes 
the experience of a society comprehensible 
in terms of more general categories. These 
categories represent both previously 
articulated normative guidelines and more 
general value assumptions about what to expect 
from social life (p.20). 
Alexander's point of view provides a functional 
definition of news. News is raw information that is 
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continuously processed on the basis of general categories. 
These categories reflect normal guidelines and general 
social value assumptions that are necessary for people to 
function in societies. 
Early theorists in this field see news as information 
of interest to the general public. News, as some of the 
theorists see, is just what happened or is happening in the 
world. As Romano (1986) noted, "the old-fashioned view 
that 'news' is simply a mirror placed before reality still 
1 i ves" ( p. 3 9) . 
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However, more theorists in the field of mass 
communication tend to define "news" from another 
perspective. They seem to put more emphasis on the hidden 
meaning of "news." Sigal (1986), in his discussion of news 
sources, contests that, "··· news is not reality, but a 
sampling of sources' portrayals of reality, mediated by news 
organizations" (pp.27-28). He further states that, "News is 
not what happens, but what someone says has happened or will 
happen" (p.15). Sigal's view of news is supported by other 
like-minded communication theorists like Carey (1986), 
Romano (1986) and Howitt (1982). 
If we take the assumption that news is not what 
actually happened or will happen in reality, then, does it 
mean that news reporting is fiction? This question leads 
our discussion to the issue of objectivity in news 
reporting. 
~ 
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Objective News Reporting 
Objectivity in news reporting has been one of the major 
areas of discussion in the study of mass communication. on 
the one hand, in all democratic societies, the very first 
requirement of news media is to be objective and be accurate 
as much as possible (Peterson, 1976, pp.86-87). On the 
other hand, people argue that facts are merely vague ideas 
that cannot be grasped and presented without interpretations 
(Romano, 1986. pp.40-41). Furthermore, objectivity in news 
reporting is like a multi-faceted mirror that gives rise to 
a number of different interpretations and understandings. 
Some people turn their attention to the requirement of news 
reporting as a starting point to analyze the issue of 
objective news reporting. 
Peterson (1976), in writing about requirements of press 
performance, noted, 
The first requirement of the press in 
contemporary society ... is to provide "a 
truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent 
account of the day's events in a context 
which gives them meaning." This requirement 
demands that the press be accurate: it must 
not lie (p.87). 
Objective news reporting is ideal. But more people 
seem to be in doubt about the possibility of "being really 
objective" in the practice of journalistic profession. 
Sigal (1986) asserted, "No procedure can assure truth 
or validity or avoid interpretation and bias" (p.15). 
Fields (1984), in her doctoral dissertation, made a 
~ 
similar point when she concluded: 
1. "Objectivity" in news production is an 
actual impossibility. 
2. News production results in messages 
which inevitably contain legitimating (or 
delegitimating), value-laden connotations 
(p.86). 
Despite the fact that different perspectives exist 
around the issue of objectivity in news reporting, there 
seems to be a general agreement that, 
Objectivity has no bearing whatsoever on the 
truthfulness or validity of a story. Nor does 
it mean that the story is free of 
interpretation or bias. Objective reporting 
means avoiding as much as possible the overt 
intrusion of the reporter's personal values 
into a news story and minimizing explicit 
interpretation in writing up the story (Sigal, 
1986, p.17). 
Fields (1984) seemed to agree with Sigal when she 
elaborated on her perspective of objective news reporting. 
She stated: 
Objectivity as a norm is useful to the extent 
that it ensures some "balance," requires an 
attempt at impartiality, and negatively 
sanctions intentional fabrications. An 
account may be "impartial," in the sense that 
"both" sides (but not all sides) present their 
refracted accounts of an event or issue 
(p.87). 
Manoff and Schudson (1986) seemed to support the above 
standpoint when they pointed out that journalism is not 
different from other types of storytelling activities. 
Journalistic work is done on the basis of its own 
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professional guidelines and principles within its own set of 
sociological, ideological, and literary constraints. When 
~ 
\ 
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journalists make their efforts to be "objective" in their 
professional practice, they demonstrate their strong sense 
of formal constraints on their work. These constraints 
include rules, procedures and traditions that tell them what 
"objectivity" stands for and when (not always) to invoke it 
(Manoff and Schudson, 1986, p.6). 
It seems that the perspective of impossible objectivity 
in news reporting is based on two important issues that 
affect the objectivity in the process of news reporting. 
One is how we interpret "fact." The other is what factors 
affect objectivity in news reporting. 
What is fact? White (1970) states the problem 
powerfully: 
Although there are innumerable facts, facts, 
unlike situations or states of affairs, don't 
exist. A distinction can be drawn between the 
occurrence of an event or the existence of a 
state of affairs and the fact that such an 
event occurred or that such a state of affairs 
exists. Contrariwise, facts, but not events, 
situations, or states of affairs, can be 
disputed, challenged, assumed, or proved. 
Facts can be stated, whereas events and 
situations are described. There may be facts 
about an event, situation, or state of 
affairs, but none of the latter about a fact 
(p.80). 
Since "fact" can be disputed, challenged, assumed, or 
proved, objectivity of news reporting cannot escape 
disputation and challenge. 
Another factor that affects objective reporting is news 
selection. News selection is a continuous complex process 
that turns raw information into what is called "news" on the 
-, 
! 
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basis of general categories and under professional 
guidelines. News presented to the general public is not raw 
information that we normally find in daily life. It is 
filtered, processed, and reshaped information that intends 
to fulfill certain purposes. For a better understanding of 
how news selection affects "objectivity" in news reporting, 
the process of news selection needs to be examined. 
News Selection 
Hiebert (1982) provides a discussion of five criteria 
for news selection: timeliness, proximity, prominence, 
consequences, and human interest (pp.422-423). 
In order to be "news," it has to be timely. As an old 
cliche goes, "Nothing is as old as yesterday's newspaper." 
To be more exact, news loses its newsworthiness if it is not 
timely. 
Proximity is also important in news selection. No news 
is more important than news about events that take place 
under one's nose. For example, the earthquake in Bay area 
California a few years ago might have been much more 
important to the local people than the election of the 
governor in its neighbor state Nevada. 
Prominence never fails to make news because the more 
prominent the source, the more newsworthy it is. The 
President of the United States or a movie star is obviously 
more newsworthy than a waiter or salesman. That explains 
why the rich and famous frequently become the focus of news 
media. 
Consequences have a direct bearing on newsworthiness. 
An ordinary human being might suddenly become newsworthy by 
discovering a cure for AIDS because the consequence of his 
discovery means an end to the fear of that deadly disease. 
Human interest is an important aspect in news 
selection. A large portion of each day's news is selected 
on the basis of factors like adventure, conflict, humor, 
pathos and bathos, sex, the odd and the unusual simply 
because such news is interesting to people. 
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In Reading The News, Romano (1986) perceived the above 
five elements of news selection as the traditional way to 
select news (p.59). In his discussion of news selection, 
Romano (1986) offered a specific list of things normally 
covered or not covered in modern newspapers. 
The press covers symbolic events, the formerly famous, 
anniversaries, the possible, tasteful matters, stories that 
can win it prizes, covers political friends favorably and 
enemies unfavorably; the press does not cover events if 
doing so may cause the death of innocents, the press does 
not report matters that reflect badly on people in its good 
graces, nor does the press critically examine privileged 
cultural beliefs (for detailed discussion, see Romano, 1986, 
pp.48-59). 
"Gatekeeper" is another important concept in the 
process of news selection. Howitt (1982) said: 
The concept of gatekeeper was about the first 
major theoretical idea developed to explain 
the way in which media organizations operate 
and function (p.l9). 
A gatekeeper is an individual or a group of people who 
have the power to decide what is to be included and what is 
to be excluded before raw information is processed into 
"news." In this sense, gatekeepers play a key role in the 
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process of news selection. Normally, a gatekeeper is viewed 
as one individual who makes decisions about what should be 
printed in the paper. But in reality, almost anybody could 
function as a gatekeeper, though nobody has to be one. 
Public Need For News 
As stated earlier, news is information that has been 
filtered, processed, and then, presented to the public. 
News, just as all sorts of information, is vital for everyone 
to survive, to make judgement, and to deal with the 
environment. Hiebert (1982) provides a long discussion on 
human need for information. All human beings need 
information for one reason or another. Even in primitive 
times, each tribe sent its best climber to climb the tallest 
tree to look out for information on which the tribe depended 
for survival. 
In modern societies, people mostly depend on mass media 
for information they need to survive and function. 
Journalists in modern societies function like the tree 
climbers in primitive times. They provide information on 
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what is happening in the world, in their own countries, and 
in our neighborhoods as well. 
Besides our need for news to survive and to function in 
modern society, we also need news and other information to 
satisfy our desire for knowledge, to satisfy our personal 
interests, curiosity, and to simply get along in human 
society. To put it briefly, news as information processed 
to serve human needs plays a vital part in human survival 
and social development. 
THEORETICAL ISSUES OF MASS MEDIA AND MASS MOVEMENT 
Basic Concepts In Mass Communication Theory 
as: 
The process of mass communication can be simplified 
Who says what to whom through what channel with what 
effects. 
The process of communication starts with a 
communicator. The mass communicator, however, differs 
significantly from the individual communicator in 
interpersonal communication. Hiebert (1982), in writing 
about the basic concepts in mass communication, stated: 
... the communicator or sender in mass 
communication is rarely one individual. The 
people we identify as mass communicators are 
for the most part only the visible portion of 
a vast and complex network of people. 
The mass communicator in American media is 
usually a complex organization, although 
individuals at times seem to function as mass 
communicators (pp.77-78). 
The second element is the message. Hiebert (1982) 
employed the concept of "message unit" which involves the 
interaction of three elements, namely, content, code, and 
medium. 
1. Content is the data, the idea, the 
substance. It is the communication. 
2. Code is the symbol system. And the symbols 
used have a significant impact on the content. 
It is communication language. 
3. Medium is the organizational structure, the 
framework on which the ideas are woven. The 
technology, the tools, the practices, and so 
forth make each mass medium's expression of 
the same content different. It is the 
organization (p.96). 
The third, and probably the most important element in 
mass communication, is the audience. Without a audience, 
there would be no mass communication, or any other 
communication at all. 
The focus of the entire mass communication 
process is on its destination -- the audience. 
Why would a conglomerate communicator send 
content if it were not for audiences and the 
reactions of individuals that make up 
audiences (Hiebert, 1982, p.183). 
Unlike the receiver in the interpersonal communication 
process who is normally an individual, the receiver in mass 
communication is part of a larger audience (listeners, 
readers, and viewers). 
Tan (1986) discussed the difference between 
interpersonal communication and mass communication in his 
writing on communication theories. Besides the differences 
in communication channel and message effects, one of the 
special characteristics of mass communication that 
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distinguishes it from interpersonal communication is the 
nature of the receiver in mass communication. According to 
Tan, Herbert Blumer classified mass audience into three 
categories: 1) heterogeneous in composition, its members 
coming from different groups in society; (2) composed of 
individuals who do not know each other, who are spatially 
separated from one another, and who cannot interact with one 
another; and {3) having no leadership or formal organization 
{Tan, 1986, p.67). 
This early definition of "mass society" is the basis of 
early research that focused on how members of the mass 
selected their communication and how the "mass" was affected 
by the media. This perspective views the "mass" as isolated 
individuals who were passive, unstable, and easily 
influenced. 
However, as Tan {1986) later pointed out: 
More recently researchers have discarded the 
view of "mass audience" as a passive aggregate 
of disconnected individuals and instead have 
emphasized social structures or group 
affiliations among members of the audience, 
the social nature of most of our contact with 
the mass media, and the reciprocal nature of 
media-audience relationships (p.68). 
The communication channel is the passage through which 
a message is sent to the receiver. The channel takes a 
variety of forms in the process of mass communication. 
Radio broadcasting sends messages through electric waves, 
television reaches its audience by similar means like radio 
does, and newspapers reach their audience by means of 
printed messages on the paper. In short, channels are 
bridges that connect communicators with audience. 
Filters are indispensable for the audience of mass 
communication to decode the messages they receive. Hiebert 
(1982) defined filters as: 
... the complex mechanisms we use to "decode" 
messages. Your filters are a part of you; 
they are learned, and can be relearned. They 
can be improved, and their improvement can 
make you a better audience member. Filters 
are, in effect, frames of references (p.171). 
This definition contains two components. First, 
filters are not something we are equipped with by nature. 
They can be learned and improved as part of individual 
growth. Secondly, filters are tools that people utilize to 
decode communication messages. 
According to Hiebert (1982), there are four types of 
filters that we can learn to use in our daily communication 
activities. 
1. Informational or lingual filters: Each of 
us has learned a variety of languages and the 
responses to those codes. 
Without accurate informational filters, no 
positive communication can occur. If you 
cannot decode the message, you cannot 
communicate (p.173). 
2. Physical filters include two aspects. One 
is internal physical conditions, and the other 
is external physical conditions. 
Internal physical conditions refer to the 
well-being or health of the individual 
audience member. A person who is physically 
ill filters messages differently from the way 
he or she does in good health. 
External physical conditions refer to the 
environment or surroundings in which we 
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receive messages. If the room in which you 
are reading this book is too hot, too cold, 
too dark, or too noisy, the environment will 
affect your senses and the way you filter the 
content of this page (p.174). 
3. Psychological filters are related to our 
personalities based on each individual 
experiences. We structure our perception of 
the world in terms that are meaningful to us, 
according to our frames of reference, our 
filters. This process has been described as 
selective exposure, selective perception, and 
selective retention (p.176) (for discussion of 
selective perception and selective exposure, 
see Schramm, 1973). 
4. Cultural filters ... [are] how culture 
affects the way a person sends or receives 
messages. (They) are colored, distorted, and 
polarized by our culture (p.177). 
The last element in the mass communication formula is 
the effects caused by the messages sent from the 
communicator. The effects of mass communication are 
measured, in part, by the feedback from the audience. 
Many responses to mass communication resemble those in 
interpersonal communication, such as frowning, yawning, 
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coughing, throwing down the magazine, kicking the TV set, or 
talking back. But unlike those in interpersonal 
communication, none of them is observable to the mass 
communicator because they are all indirect feedback. Again, 
Hiebert (1982) listed six different types of feedback 
(pp.198-202). 
The first is representative feedback. Since the 
audience of mass communication is so large and so widely 
spread, it is impossible to measure feedback from each and 
every audience member. Therefore, a representative sample 
of the audience is selected for measurement, and the 
response of the sample is projected scientifically to the 
whole. 
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The second is indirect feedback. Mass communicators, 
like newspaper reporters and performers on TV, rarely 
receive any direct response from audience members. Usually, 
the feedback comes from a third party: a rating organization 
or a polling company. 
The third is delayed feedback. In mass communication, 
feedback from the audience is rarely direct and timely. The 
delay is caused by a number of factors. Most of all, it 
occurs because the mass communicator is not in direct touch 
with the audience. Letters to the editors have to go 
through the mail. Polls and surveys take time to conduct 
and study. 
The fourth is cumulative feedback. Simply because 
immediate and individual response from the audience is 
infrequent, the mass communicator generally accumulates data 
over a period of time from a variety of sources. Then the 
data are stored for future use in making decisions regarding 
what the public wants in the way of media content. 
The fifth is quantitative feedback. This refers to 
reliable numbers of responses from the audience. A mass 
communicator is more interested in how many people respond 
than how each individual responds. 
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The last is institutional feedback. Mass communication 
feedback is obtained through large and complex organizations, 
such as rating companies, polling companies, survey 
organizations, and so forth. The feedback is 
institutionalized during the process of being obtained and 
sent back to the mass communicator. 
Effects Of Mass Media 
There seems to be a general agreement that mass media 
have affected the course of human development. At the same 
time, it is difficult to establish absolute cause-and-effect 
relationships. Barelson and Janowitz (1966) made the point 
when they said: 
The effects of communication are many and 
diverse. They may be short-range or long-run. 
They may be manifest or latent. They may be 
strong or weak. They may derive from any 
number of aspects of the communication 
content. They may be considered as 
psychological or economic or sociological. 
They may operate upon opinions, values, 
information levels, skills, taste, or overt 
behavior (p.379). 
In fact, the effects of mass media are so diverse that 
many people feel pessimistic about achieving scientific 
verification for any aspect of the communication content. 
However, other people are more optimistic about analyzing 
the effects of mass media. They view mass media as only one 
of many factors to be considered in studying the effect of 
the environment on human behavior. This group of people 
believe that if the media can be seen as part of the total 
environment that affects people's acts and decisions, a 
theory for mass media effects might be developed. DeFleur 
(1977) synthesized various theories to arrive at his 
comprehensive statement: 
The effects of a given mass communicated 
message sent over a given channel will depend 
upon a large number of psychological 
characteristics and social category 
similarities among the members of the 
audience; these effects will depend upon the 
kind of social groups within which these 
people are acting and the relationships that 
they have with specific types of persons 
within them; they will depend upon the social 
norms that prevail among such groups in 
reality as well as upon the "definitions of 
the situation" which the communicated messages 
are to suggest (pp.152-153). 
On the basis of Weiss's (1968) collection of research 
on the effects of mass media of communication, Hiebert 
(1982) offered a list of the impact of mass media in modern 
society. 
1. The effects of mass media on cognition and 
comprehension. 
2. The effects of mass media on attitude and 
value change. 
3. The effects of mass media on behavioral 
change. 
4. The effects of mass media on children. 
5. The effects of violence in the mass media 
on American society. 
6. The effects of erotica in the mass media on 
American society. 
On a broader level, both politically and culturally, 
especially in the United States, the effects of mass media 
are real and obvious. 
On the political level, the whole Watergate phenomenon 
was a media event because the media participated in the 
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political events that led to former President Nixon's 
resignation. The media had a great deal of impact on those 
events, and the press significantly affected the process by 
which the former President was toppled. 
The press affects the political agenda setting and 
decision making. Linsky {1986) has written, 
Policymakers generally share the view that 
among the most significant impacts of the 
press occur early on the policymaking process, 
when it is not yet clear which issues will be 
addressed and what questions will be decided. 
Officials believe that the media do a lot to 
set the policy agenda and to influence how an 
issue is understood by policymakers, interest 
groups, and the public (p.87). 
On the cultural level, the mass media have a 
significant effect on the changing of American society. 
The civil rights movement and the women's movement of the 
past thirty years are, in part, media phenomena that have 
had a great impact on the entire American society. 
28 
The civil rights movement and the women's movement were 
so powerful that people's value orientation was changed 
dramatically. Part of the power of these movements came 
from the news media presentation of the movements. In other 
words, the news media changed the traditional way to think 
and look at the American society. And new thinking and new 
value orientation reinforced the growth of the movements. 
Why Do People Communicate? 
Tan {1986) summarized the basic functions of mass 
communication as an answer to the question of why people 
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communicate. On the communicator's part, the function of 
mass communication is to inform, to teach, to persuade, to 
please, and to satisfy receiver needs. On the receiver's 
part, the function of mass communication is (1) to learn of 
threats and opportunities; to understand the environment; to 
test reality; to reach decisions; (2) to acquire skills and 
knowledge necessary to function effectively in the 
community; to learn appropriate values, behaviors, and roles 
for acceptance in the community; (3) to enjoy, relax, be 
entertained, and be distracted from problems and stress 
(Tan, 1986, pp.69-70). 
Bond (1967) made a similar statement tersely in his 
Introduction to Journalism: "Journalism has four main 
reasons for being: to inform, to interpret, to guide, to 
entertain" (p.5). 
Mass Media and Political Movements 
Political movements or social movements affect the 
changes in people's attitudes and value orientations. Yet, 
it is actually the change in people's values and behaviors 
that result in political movements and social changes. In 
his discussion of mass media and social change, Tan (1986) 
wrote: 
Social change involves influencing a large 
number of people so that their "social facts" 
are altered. The mass media, because they are 
able to reach large audiences simultaneously, 
can be effective tools of influence. Thus, 
mass communication logically and naturally 
should take a central role in the study of 
social change. Before existing values can be 
changed, the new values should be made clear 
to the members of the social units; the mass 
media could be the vehicles by which these new 
values are introduced (p.374). 
A similar viewpoint is provided by Kielbowiz and 
Schever (1986) who stated: 
The mass media are one of the major forces 
that mold and shape social movements, which 
challenge the established order and prescribe 
different paths along which change should take 
place. In certain instances the media have 
even "become central to life and death" 
(pp.71-72). 
Political movements and social events depend on mass 
media to send out their messages. In other words, mass 
media shape and also define political and social movements 
in the process of reporting and presentation to the public. 
Gitlin (1980), in his writing about the SDS movement, 
stated: 
... political movements feel called upon to 
rely on large-scale communications in order to 
matter, to say who they are and what they 
intend to publics they want to sway .... Mass 
media define the public significance of 
movement events or, by blanking them out, 
actively deprive them of larger significance 
(p.3). 
Mass movements have to rely on the power of mass media 
to define them, to shape them, and create an image to exert 
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influence on any change in society. The power of mass media 
is such that: 
... people find themselves relying on the media 
for concepts, for images of their heroes, for 
guiding information, for emotional charges, 
for a recognition of public values, for 
symbols in general, even for language (Gitlin, 
1980, p.1). 
The above statement suggests that the public perceives 
and understands a given political movement on the basis of 
how the mass media define and portray it. In other words, 
the image of a political movement is created and defined by 
the mass media. 
Media images also become implicated in a 
movement's self-image; media certify leaders 
and officially noteworthy "personalities"; 
indeed, they are able to convert leadership 
into celebrity, something quite different. 
The forms of coverage accrete into systematic 
framing, and this framing, much amplified, 
helps determine the movement's fate (Gitlin, 
1980, p.3). 
Since political movements are so much defined and even 
created by mass media, it becomes necessary to note in what 
way that mass media shape the image of political movements. 
To understand the phenomenon of how mass media "frame" 
and shape political movements, one important thing is to 
understand the notion of "media frame" and what role it 
plays in the process of defining and framing political 
movements. 
Tuchman (1986) synthesized the notion of "media frame" 
when she wrote, "What makes the world beyond direct 
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experience look natural is a media frame" (p.6). This point 
is further elaborated by Gitlin (1980) when he said: 
Media frames are persistent patterns of 
cognition, interpretation, and presentation, 
of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by 
which symbol-handlers routinely organize 
discourse, whether verbal or visual. Frames 
are principles of selection, emphasis, and 
presentation composed of little tacit theories 
about what exists, what happens, and what 
matters (pp.6-7). 
Theories of mass communication and social change are 
general guidelines that provide a broad basis for the 
present research. The concept of "media frame" has been 
employed in this study. The relationship between news 
reporting and the Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989 is 
explored by using the theories reviewed in this chapter. 
Specific Issues of Concern 
The general issue of this research is to show how some 
leading u.s. newspapers portrayed the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement in China. Three U.S. newspapers will be examined. 
They are: The New York Times, Washington Post, and Los 
Angeles Times. Based on the literature reviewed in this 
chapter, the following specific research questions are 
posed. 
1. How much attention did the three newspapers 
give to the Chinese pro-democracy movement? 
2. How did the three newspapers portray the 
power struggle on the top level in the 
Chinese government and the Chinese 
communist party? 
3. Has there been any change in the image of 
China in terms of the symbolic 
representations used by the three u.s. 
newspapers during and right after the 
Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989? 
The following chapter will discuss in detail the 
methods and techniques employed to address the research 
questions. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
INTRODUCTION 
Content analysis is employed as the research method in 
the present study. Holsti (1969) defined content analysis 
as one of the observational techniques "for making 
inferences by systematically and objectively identifying 
specified characteristics of messages" (p.601). The key to 
this definition is its emphasis on systematic and objective 
identification of specific items in given messages. Rubin, 
B., Rubin, M., and Piele (1986) provided a similar 
definition when they wrote: 
Content analysis ... focuses on the 
characteristics of the content of the 
communication. The purpose is to learn 
something about the content, those who 
produced the messages, andjor the effects the 
content might have on receivers (p.63). 
Krippendorff (1980) offered a concise definition which 
is also useful: "Content analysis is a research technique 
for making replicable and valid inferences from data to 
their context" (p.21). 
The purpose of content analysis, like all research 
techniques, is to provide new knowledge, new insights, a 
representation of "facts," and a practical guide to action. 
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Kidder (1986) discussed some of requirements for using 
content analysis in communication research when he suggested 
that content analysis requires: 
... objectivity of coding categories in order 
to assure reliability, systematic application 
of these coding systems across a 
representative sample of material in order to 
control observer bias, and consistency in 
theoretical aims so that the findings can be 
related to some relevant variable or variables 
(pp.306-307). 
Along with technical requirements for content analysis, 
Krippendorff (1980) offered a theoretical framework which is 
based on the following six elements: 
1) the data as communicated to the analyst 
2) the context of the data 
3) how the analyst's knowledge partititions 
his reality 
4) the target of a content analysis 
5) inference as the basic intellectual task 
6) validity as ultimate criteria of success 
(p.21) 
First, in content analysis, it must be clear which data 
are analyzed, how they are defined, and from which 
population they are drawn. Second, the context relative to 
which data are analyzed must be made explicit. In other 
words, the analyst must define the boundaries beyond which 
its analysis does not extend. Third, the analyst's interest 
and knowledge determine the construction of the context 
within which inferences are realized. Then, the aim or the 
target of the inferences must be clearly stated. The basic 
task of content analysis is to make inferences from 
available data to certain aspects of the context. 
Conclusions are drawn on the basis of categorized findings. 
To assure the validity of content analysis, detailed 
references and sources should be provided and specified so 
that readers could track and comprehend the results of any 
given research. 
RESEARCH DATA 
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The research data were drawn from three "elite" u.s. 
newspapers. They are: The New York Times, Washington Post, 
and Los Angeles Times. The first two newspapers were chosen 
for their established reputation, opinion leadership, and 
influence in this country and abroad (Semmel, 1977). Los 
Angeles Times was selected because over the years it had 
shown consistent news coverage of China (Coffey, 1978). 
CODING CATEGORIES 
Each of the three newspapers was coded and analyzed for 
a period of two months and one week, from April 15, 1989 to 
June 20, 1989. This time period was selected because it 
covers the entire pro-democracy movement, including some 
immediate international media reaction to the violent ending 
of the "Beijing Incident." 
This time period was further divided into four segments 
to reflect the four closely-connected stages of the pro-
democracy movement. 
1) April 15, 1989 -- May 3, 1989 (Hu Yaobang's death 
and the seemingly spontaneous student 
demonstrations); 
2) May 4, 1989 -- May 19, 1989 (May 4th Movement 
Anniversary, Gorbachev's China visit, and the 
imposition of martial law in Beijing); 
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3) May 20, 1989 -- June 3, 1989 (escalation of tension 
and the power struggle on the top level, which 
contributed to the violent ending of mass 
demonstrations and students' occupation of Tiananmen 
Square); 
4) June 4, 1989 -- June 20, 1989 (the nationwide 
arrests, executions, international media reaction 
and the two weeks following the "Beijing incident.") 
News stories concerning the "Beijing Incident" on the 
front page of each newspaper were measured by square inches 
and stories in inside pages of each newspaper were counted 
as an indicator to show how much attention each newspaper 
gave to the "Beijing Incident." 
The appearance of key Chinese officials in the three 
newspapers were coded as a possible indicator of the 
fluctuations in the power struggle at the top level within 
the Chinese government. The key officials were selected on 
the basis of how frequently they were mentioned in American 
news media. These key officials are Deng Xiaoping, Zhao 
Ziyang, Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Chen Yun, Wan li, and Li 
Xiannian. Any of these people, described by any news 
stories either favorably (+1) or unfavorably (-1), were put 
into one of the following categories: 
Losing power -- any individual or group of 
people described as becoming 
less powerful, including any 
unfavorable quotation or 
mention of denunciation. 
Gaining power -- any individual or group of 
people described as becoming 
more powerful, including the 
person's appearance in 
favorable background or any 
favorable quotation. 
Finally, the use of any symbolic representations of 
China was coded to show any possible change in the image of 
China in the perception of the three newspapers. The 
symbolic representations are: "Communist China," "Beijing 
government," "Beijing regime," "Chinese Communist regime," 
"China," "Chinese government," "PRC," and "mainland China." 
According to Chang (1989), these symbols could be put 
into three different categories: ideological, geographical 
and legal. 
Ideological symbols attached ideology to the 
word, including Communist China, Red China, 
Chinese Communists, Chinese Communist regime 
... they invite emotional associations and 
private interpretations. Geographical symbols 
tended to be neutral, showing no political 
connotations. They were Peking, mainland China .... 
Legal symbols implied acceptance of 
legitimacy and existence as a political 
entity, involving the official title of China: 
People's Republic of China .... Unlike the 
ideological symbols, the last two types of 
symbols tend to be more specific, leaving 
little room for individual sentiments and 
projection (p.322). 
Any increase in the use of ideological symbols like 
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"Communist China" or "Beijing regime," were viewed as a 
negative change in the image of China in the perception of 
the three U.S. newspapers. Both positive and negative 
symbols in each paragraph were only coded once to avoid 
possible bias associated with individual writing style. 
However, no positive change of symbolic representation of 
China was presumed, such as "Democratic China," or "Free 
China." 
PROCEDURE OF DATA COLLECTION 
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The entire data collection was carried out in two parts 
with the attempt to assure the reliability of the research 
method. 
In the first part of data collection, a pretest was 
conducted to anchor the final data analysis. The pretest 
addressed the first and last research questions (How much 
attention did each newspaper give to the "Beijing 
Incident?" Has there been any change in the image of China 
during the time of the "Beijing Incident?"). 
The purpose of the pretest was to establish "before" 
and "after" baselines for the analysis. The pretest was 
conducted by means of measuring front-page space, counting 
article numbers, and coding symbols in the three U.S. 
newspapers for a period of two weeks. The pre-movement 
period was two months before the pro-democracy movement and 
the post-movement period was two months after the pro-
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democracy movement. The first period was Feb.5, 1989 --
Feb.18, 1989; and the second period was from Aug.6, 1989 
Aug.19, 1989. The pretest was planned and finished before 
the actual data collection started so that the researcher 
could establish baselines and be better prepared for certain 
unforeseen problems and obstacles. The method proved 
consistent. 
The actual data collection started after the pretest 
was run successfully. One undergraduate and two graduate 
students were invited to participate in part of the data 
collection process. Each of them was given detailed 
instruction regarding how and what to collect. The 
following principles had to be observed and maintained by 
all the coders throughout the data collection process: 
1) All news stories on the front pages of each 
newspaper had to be measured and coded. All news 
stories in inside pages had to be counted. Most of the 
articles about the pro-democracy movement were carried 
on front pages, in news sections, and in forum 
sections. However, some of them were printed in other 
sections, like the Metropolitan section, the National 
section, and even in the Living section. 
2) Every appearance of key Chinese officials in the 
three newspapers had to be coded and put into either 
the "losing power" (-1) or the "gaining power" (+1) 
category. In case their casting was too ambiguous to 
be put into either of the two categories, it was 
regarded as no indication of power struggle and, 
therefore, not coded according to the scheme. 
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3) Symbolic representations of China, no matter where 
they were found, had to be coded. Coding units were 
article paragraphs that contained symbolic 
representations of China. Paragraphs with no symbols 
were excluded from the coding process. Symbols in each 
paragraph, either positive or negative, could be coded 
only once. Results of coding were then transformed 
into percentages based on frequency distributions in a 
given category. 
Each coder was required to perform three tasks with 
premade charts and a standard ruler (see Appendix B). 
First, each participant counted the number of news stories 
on the front page and in inside pages. All the news stories 
on the front page, including photos, were measured with a 
ruler to determine how much space they occupied on the front 
page. For example, if a front page story and a photo was 
1.25 inch wide and 4 inches long, the photo was 3.75 inches 
wide and 5.5 inches long, they were coded as 1,1:1.25x4, 
3.75x5.5, and so on. This formula is intepreted as "one 
news story and one photo, the news story takes up 1.25x4 
square inches and the photo takes up 3.75x5.5 square inches 
on the front page." If there were more stories in inside 
pages, they were counted to obtain a total for each edition 
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of each newspaper. 
The second task was to identify each appearance of key 
Chinese officials and record the information on predesigned 
recording sheets (see Appendix B). For instance, a news 
story said, "Li Peng won't stay long." This statement was 
coded as a negative indicator to show Li was losing power. 
Therefore, it was coded as -1 under his name in the 
recording sheet. If another story said, "Zhao Ziyang seemed 
to be gaining the upper hand in the power struggle within 
the communist party," it was coded as +1 in the recording 
sheet to illustrate a positive indicator of gaining power. 
The third task that each coder had to perform was to 
record symbolic representations of China. On the 
predesigned recording sheets, each label was given a stroke 
(/) wherever it was found in news stories. Same symbols were 
only recorded once in each paragraph. Then, the results 
were transformed into percentages based on frequencies in a 
given category. 
All research tasks were performed on microfilm 
available at Portland State University. The three 
newspapers on microfilm are slightly smaller than they 
actually are. The front page of The New York Times is 18.5 
inches long and 11.62 inches wide, with each column measured 
as 1.86 inches wide. The front page of the Washington Post 
is measured as 19.3 inches long and 11.4 inches wide. Each 
column is 1.75 inches wide. The front page of the Los 
Angelas Times is 18.63 inches long and 11.75 inches wide. 
Each column is 1.75 inches wide. 
The following chapter will present research findings 
and interpretations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS/ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the research findings and 
analysis of results. Before analyzing and discussing the 
research findings, a chronology of the Chinese pro-
democracy movement from the Los Angeles Times (June 4, 1989) 
is offered to guide readers through the development of the 
pro-democracy movement. 
CHRONOLOGY 
April 15, 1989: Former Communist Party 
chief Hu Yaobang dies. Beijing University 
students put up posters praising him and 
indirectly criticizing opponents who forced 
his resignation in early 1987 after student 
demonstrations in 1986-1987. 
April 17, 1989: Thousands of students march 
in Beijing and Shanghai, shouting," Long live 
Hu Yaobang! Long live democracy!" 
April 22, 1989: While official memorial 
ceremonies are held for Hu at nearby Great 
Hall of the People, students defy police 
orders to leave the square. 
April 26, 1989: People's Daily publishes 
major Communist party attack on protesters, 
angering students. 
April 27, 1989: More than 50,000 students, 
with wide support from people on the street, 
surge past police lines and fill Tiananmen 
Square, chanting slogans for democracy and 
freedom. 
April 29, 1989: Officials meet with student 
leaders, but independent student groups are 
not satisfied and continue a class boycott at 
41 universities. 
May 4, 1989: About 100,000 students and 
supporters march on Tian An Men Square to 
celebrate the 70th anniversary of China's 
first student movement. Demonstrations are 
held in Shanghai, Nanjing and other cities. 
About 300 journalists protest outside the 
official New China News Agency. 
May 13, 1989: About 2,000 students begin a 
hunger strike in Tian An Men Square. Number 
later grows to 3,000. 
May 15, 1989: The government deadline for 
students to leave the square passes. Soviet 
President Mikhail s. Gorbachev's welcoming 
ceremony must be moved from the square to the 
airport. 
May 17, 1989: Communist Party chief Zhao 
Ziyang pleads for students to leave the 
square. students reject his appeal and hold 
marches that generate 1 million supporters in 
Beijing. 
May 18, 1989: About 1 million people, 
including many workers, again take to the 
streets to show their support for the hunger 
strikers. Premier Li Peng issues a stern 
lecture to student leaders and refuses to 
discuss their demands. 
May 20, 1989: Martial law is declared in 
parts of Beijing after Zhao reportedly fails 
to persuade Li and other hard-liners to 
compromise. Students resume their hunger 
strike, then abandon it, saying they need 
strength for the struggle ahead. 
May 21, 1989: Students reject an order by 
Li Peng to leave Tian An Men Square or face 
military action. Defying martial law, 
hundreds of thousands of people remain in the 
square or block intersections to prevent 
troops from reaching it. 
May 25, 1989: Li makes his first appearance 
since declaring martial law. state-run radio 
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says 27 of 29 provinces support martial law, 
and military units announce they support 
martial law. 
May 27, 1989: Beijing student leaders 
propose that students end their occupation of 
Tian An Men Square. Non-Beijing students 
resist and the sit-in continues. 
May 30, 1989: students unveil their 
"Goddess of Democracy," a replica of the 
Statue of Liberty, on the square. The 
government calls it an insult to the nation. 
June 1, 1989: The Beijing municipal 
government warns foreign journalists that 
under martial law they must receive approval 
for all press coverage. Coverage of the 
demonstrations is banned. 
June 3-4, 1989: Tens of thousands of troops 
make several attempts to move on the square 
but are driven back by crowds of hundreds of 
thousands of people supporting the students. 
Riot squads beat and fire tear gas at 
demonstrators. A final push is made the 
evening of June 3, and soldiers begin firing 
on crowds. Troops surround and enter the 
square in the early morning hours of June 4 
and thousands of protesters flee. Many are 
killed and hundreds are wounded (Los Angeles 
Times, June 4, 1989, Part A, p.8). 
The 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement lasted about 
six weeks, from mid-April to early June, 1989. During this 
period of time, abundant information concerning the Chinese 
pro-democracy movement was carried in The New York Times, 
Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. 
As stated in the previous chapters, there are three 
major concerns in the present research: (1) How much 
attention did the movement receive from the three 
newspapers? (2) How did the three newspapers represent the 
power struggle in the Chinese government? (3) Has there 
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been any change in the image of China in terms of symbolic 
representations used by the three newspapers? On the basis 
of these three research questions, the research findings can 
roughly be categorized as 1) Movement coverage; 2) Power 
struggle; 3) Change in the image of China. 
MOVEMENT COVERAGE 
Table I illustrates findings of the pretest (the pre-
movement period), from Feb.5, 1989 to Feb.18, 1989. A total 
of twelve news stories and four photos were found and coded 
in the three newspapers. 
TABLE I 
PRE-MOVEMENT -- 2/5/89 to 2/18/89 
========================================================== 
Front Page(incl.photo) Inside Page Total 
Ar.# Co.In. Ph. Ar.# Ph. Ar.# %* Ph. 
---------- ------- -------- ------ ----- ---- ------------
N.Y.Times 1 36.1 1 3 1 4 16.8 2 
---------- ------- -------- ------ ----- ---- ------------
Wash.Post 0 0 0 5 1 5 0 1 
---------- ------- -------- ------ ----- ---- ------------
L.A.Times 0 0 0 3 1 3 0 1 
========================================================== 
* indicates average percentage of front-page space used by 
the three newspapers to cover the movement. Also in Table 
1, "Ar.#" means number of news stories. "Co.In." represents 
the square inches occupied by any given news story on the 
front page. "Ph." means the number of photos both on the 
front page and in inside pages. 
As Table I shows, The New York Times is the only paper 
that carried one front-page story and one photo on its front 
page during the pre-movement period. Together, the news 
story and the photo on the front page take up 36.06 square 
inches, which is 16.8% of the total front-page space. 
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On the microfilm, the total daily front-page space in 
The New York Times is 215 square inches, 232.1 square inches 
in Washington Post, and 218.8 square inches in Los Angeles 
Times. 
Both Washington Post and Los Angeles Times carried one 
photo, five and three news stories respectively in their 
inside pages. As the Chinese pro-democracy movement was 
unfolding, the front-page coverage of the movement in both 
Washington Post and Los Angeles Times began to increase 
rapidly. 
Table I shows general news coverage of events related 
to China under normal circumstances. It covers a period of 
two weeks time which is two months before the pro-democracy 
movement began (Feb.5, 1989 --Feb. 18, 1989). This table 
provides a comparison for the formal research period in the 
sense that it allows the readers to see the difference of 
news coverage of the movement at normal times and under 
extreme circumstances. 
After the pro-democracy movement began in late April 
1989, news coverage of events related to the Chinese pro-
democracy movement saw a dramatic increase in all three u.s. 
newspapers. Table II shows the findings regarding news 
coverage of the pro-democracy movement (April 15, 1989-June 
20, 1989), followed by Table III, a summary of the findings. 
TABLE II 
MOVEMENT COVERAGE 
========================================================= 
Front Page Inside Page Total 
April 15, 1989 -- May 3, 1989 
Ar.# C.In. Ph. Ar.# Ph. Ar.# %* Ph. 
N.Y.Times 7 276 6 18 6 25 6.8 12 
Wash.Post 6 213 3 15 15 21 4.8 18 
L.A.Times 11 262 1 11 5 22 6.3 6 
May 4, 1989 -- May 20, 1989 
N.Y.Times 10 471 9 13 23 41 12.9 32 
Wash.Post 11 547 8 17 23 28 13.9 31 
L.A.Times 12 416 5 26 25 38 11.2 30 
May 21, 1989 -- June 3, 1989 
N.Y.Times 17 672 12 59 50 76 22.3 62 
Wash.Post 21 841 13 42 48 63 25.9 61 
L.A.Times 23 710 9 56 40 79 23.2 49 
June 4, 1989 -- June 20, 1989 
N.Y.Times 25 815 14 104 88 129 22.3 102 
Wash.Post 30 945 12 71 47 101 23.9 59 
L.A.Times 41 1224 12 101 72 142 32.9 84 
========================================================= 
* indicates average percentage of total front-page space 
used in the movement coverage. 
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On microfilm, the front page space of each newspaper is: The 
New York Times: 18.5 inches by 11.6 inches, with six column 
of 1.86 each in width; Washington Post: 19.3 inches by 11.4 
inches, with six column of 1.75 each in width; Los Angeles 
Times: 18.63 inches by 11.75 inches, with six column of 1.75 
each in width. 
Table II shows, in the first research period, Los 
Angeles Times printed more front-page stories than did The 
New York Times and Washington Post. But The New York Times 
used a little more of its front-page space and Washington 
Post printed more photos than did the other two newspapers. 
The total front-page space used in The New York Times is 
slightly more than the other two papers. 
In the second study period, Los Angeles Times carried 
more front-page stories than did the other two papers. 
Washington Post came out first in terms of front-page space 
used to cover the movement. As for the photos are 
concerned, The New York Times printed a few more than the 
other two papers did. 
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In the third study period, Washington Post devoted more 
of its front-page space in the movement coverage than did 
the other two newspapers. Again, The New York Times carried 
more photos. Los Angeles Times took the lead in terms of 
the number of front-page stories carried in this study 
period. 
In the last study period, Los Angeles Times outnumbered 
the other two newspapers in both front-page space usage and 
the number of news stories on the front page. The New York 
Times printed more photos on its front page and in its 
inside pages. 
Findings illustrated in Table II indicates all three 
newspapers paid a great deal of attention to the development 
of the pro-democracy movement in China. They all used large 
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sections on their front pages to report the events and 
activities in China. The number of photos printed in this 
period of time is overwhelming compare to the pre-movement 
period (Feb.5, 1989 -- Feb.18, 1989). Table III is a summary 
of the news coverage of the pro-democracy movement from 
April 15, 1989 to June 20, 1989. 
TABLE III 
SUMMARY OF MOVEMENT COVERAGE -- 4/15/89 to 6/20/89 
========================================================= 
Front Page Inside Page Total 
Ar.# C.In. Ph. Ar.# Ph. Ar.# %* Ph. 
N.Y.Times 59 2234 41 212 167 271 15.7 208 
Wash.Post 68 2546 36 145 133 213 16.6 169 
L.A.Times 87 2612 27 194 142 281 18.1 169 
========================================================= 
* indicates average percentage of each paper's front-page 
coverage of the movement in the entire period of data 
collection. 
The total front-page space of each newspaper is: 14405 
square inches (The New York Times), 15551 square inches 
(Washington Post), and 14660 square inches (Los Angeles 
Times). 
Table III contains two noticeable things: 1) Los Angeles 
Times is in the leading position regarding the number of 
front page stories, front page space, number of total news 
stories, and total front page space used to report the pro-
democracy movement; 2) The New York Times printed far more 
photos on its front page and also in its inside pages than 
did the other two papers. 
All three newspapers returned to their normal foreign 
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news coverage after the pro-democracy movement was 
suppressed by force in early June, 1989. Table IV shows the 
news coverage of events in China two months after the pro-
democracy movement (Aug.6, 1989 -- Aug.l9, 1989). 
TABLE IV 
POST-MOVEMENT -- 8/6/89 to 8/19/89 
========================================================== 
Front Page (incl.Ph) Inside Page Total 
Ar.# Co.In. Ph Ar.# Ph. Ar.# %* Ph. 
----- ------- -------------
N.Y.Times 1 19.3 0 7 0 8 0.6 0 
----- ------- -------------
Wash.Post 1 17.3 o 11 0 12 0.5 0 
----- ------- ---- --------
L.A.Times 3 45.2 0 10 4 13 1.5 4 
========================================================== 
News coverage shown in Table IV is moderately higher 
than the findings in Table I, the pre-movement period. Los 
Angeles Times leads The New York Times and Washington Post in 
terms of front-page coverage, number of front-page news 
stories and number of inside page stories. 
Findings of the entire research period, including pre-
movement and post-movement period demonstrate the 
consistency of Los Angeles Times in covering the events 
related to China. This result conforms with the result of 
the research conducted by Coffey, which concluded that Los 
Angeles Times had shown consistent news coverage of China 
over the years (Coffey, 1978). 
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POWER STRUGGLE 
Table I shows the power struggle within the Chinese 
government before martial law was declared in Beijing on May 
20, 1989. 
TABLE V 
POWER STRUGGLE -- 5/5/89 to 5/19/89 
========================================================= 
Deng Xiaoping 
Zhao Ziyang 
Li Peng 
Yang shangkun 
Chen Yun 
Wan Li 
Li Xiannian 
N.Y.Times 
+ 
5 11 
21 4 
4 16 
1 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Wash.Post 
+ 
2 3 
3 6 
10 3 
2 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
L.A.Times 
+ 
3 2 
2 1 
4 9 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Total 
+ 
10 16 
26 11 
18 28 
4 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
========================================================= 
The above table illustrates the research findings 
concerning power struggle within the Chinese government 
perceived by the three U.S. newspapers before martial law was 
imposed in Beijing. As far as the power struggle is 
concerned, the attention of the three U.S. newspapers mainly 
focus on the first three officials on top of the list, 
namely, Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Li Peng. 
The total figure shows that Zhao was winning the power 
struggle (+26 vs.-11), and both Deng and Li were losing (+10 
vs.-16 1 +18 vs.-28). The New York Times carried more 
stories favorable to Zhao rather than negative (+21 vs.-4). 
Washington Post is the only paper that perceived Li as 
winning the power struggle (+10 vs. -3). President Yang 
Shangkun received little attention and was perceived as 
gaining power (+4 vs.-1). 
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Power struggle caught the attention of news media after 
People's Daily denounced the student demonstration on April 
26, 1989. The top Chinese officials were divided into two 
groups around the issue of what attitude should be adopted 
towards the student demonstration and their demands for more 
freedom and democracy. Premier Li Peng, representing a 
group of aged leaders, was firm and harsh to the students. 
His rough attitude was most public when he met with student 
representatives in the Great Hall of the People and refused 
to consider their demands. 
On the contrary, the party leader Zhao Ziyang was 
conciliatory to the demonstrators. He was all tears in 
Tiananmen Square when he was talking for the last time to 
the people on the square. He tried to persuade students to 
leave the square and seek solutions to solve problems 
through legal channels. But his proposal found few 
supporters on the square. 
Under normal circumstances, the party leader was 
supposed to be the highest ranking official in decision 
making. So, the party leader, Zhao Ziyang, was the person 
to declare martial law. Yet, Zhao did not show up in the 
meeting at which Premier Li Peng declared martial law. 
All three newspapers, based on reports from their 
correspondents in China, provided readers with many 
inconsistent predictions about the power struggle in the 
Chinese government. But that seems to be the best they 
could because many news reports could not be confirmed when 
chaos existed in every major city in China. An Asian 
diplomat put it this way, 
China has been in turmoil and without any 
effective central government since Prime 
Minister Li and President Yang summoned army 
troops to the capital on Saturday morning to 
suppress the nation's democracy movement 
(Kristof, 1989). 
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As Table VI illustrates, the confusion in China remained 
unclear until the end of the movement. 
TABLE VI 
POWER STRUGGLE -- 5/20/89 to 6/4/89 
========================================================== 
Deng Xiaoping 
Zhao Ziyang 
Li Peng 
Yang Shangkun 
Chen Yun 
Wan Li 
Li Xiannian 
N.Y.Times 
+ 
17 36 
17 79 
51 56 
2 5 
1 0 
2 0 
1 0 
Wash.Post 
+ 
15 5 
14 49 
20 36 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
L.A. Times 
+ 
23 18 
36 48 
Total 
+ 
55 59 
67 176 
32 49 103 141 
3 0 5 5 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 0 1 0 
========================================================== 
The above table illustrates the three newspapers' 
perceptions of the power struggle in the Chinese government 
after martial law was imposed in Beijing on May 20, 1989. 
In the second research period concerning the power 
struggle in the Chinese government, both Zhao Ziyang and Li 
Peng were perceived as losing power. Compared to both Zhao 
and Li, Deng Xiaoping received more positive comments and 
descriptions from Los Angeles Times (+23 vs.-18) and 
Washington Post (+15 vs. -5). 
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Throughout the research period on power struggle, Chen 
Yun (Chairman of the Central Consultative Committee), Wan Li 
(Head of the National People's Congress), and Li Xiannian 
(former President) were given little attention from the 
three newspapers. Overall, according to the press, it 
seemed nobody was winning the power struggle. As one of the 
news stories in The New York Times says, "Beijing creates a 
no-win situation" (The New York Times, May 23, 1989, p. A-
29). 
CHANGE IN THE IMAGE OF CHINA 
Table VII shows symbolic representations of China before 
the pro-democracy movement took place in April, 1989. In all 
three newspapers, "China" is the most often used symbol to 
refer to China. The percentage of use of other symbols to 
represent China is very low. In all three newspapers, the 
use of ideological symbols did not pass 5%, with an average 
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of only 2%. "Beijing" was used more than any other symbol 
except "China." All in all, 90 paragraphs were coded in this 
pre-movement period. In this period, over 85% of the time 
the three newspapers used "China" to refer to China. China's 
official title, the People's Republic of China, was used only 
a little more than two percent. 
TABLE VII 
IMAGE OF CHINA -- 2/5/89 to 2/18/89 
========================================================== 
Communist* PRC** Mainland China Beijing N*** 
China China 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------ --------
N.Y.Times 1% 2.7% 3.8% 82.9% 11.5% 20 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------ --------
Wash.Post 0% 2% 0% 90% 8% 39 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------ --------
L.A.Times 5% 2.5% 0% 85% 7.5% 31 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------ --------
Total 2% 2.4% 1.3% 85.9% 9% 90 
========================================================= 
* This symbol includes Communist China, Beijing regime, 
Deng's regime, Chinese Communists, Chinese Communist regime, 
Red China, and the Chinese totalitarianism. 
** PRC: People's Republic of China. 
***Entries are number of Paragraphs. Paragraphs with no 
symbols are excluded. 
Table VIII illustrates the overall change in the image 
of China perceived by the three u.s. newspapers. In all 
three newspapers, there is a gradual increase in the use of 
ideological symbols to refer to China as the Chinese pro-
democracy movement developed. As Table VIII shows, the use 
of ideological symbols increased dramatically after martial 
law was imposed in Beijing on May 20, 1989. 
TABLE VIII 
CHANGE IN THE IMAGE OF CHINA 
The New York Times 
========================================================== 
Communist* PRC** Mainland China Beijing N*** 
China China 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
4/15--5/3 6.4% 1.6% 0.7% 68.1% 23.2% 84 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
5/4--5/19 8.3% 3.3% 1.7% 65.6% 21.1% 160 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
5/20--6/3 10.7% 1% 1.1% 72.7% 14.5% 315 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
6/4--6/20 31.2% 2.4% 0.8% 55.8% 9.8% 467 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
Total 20% 2% 1% 63% 14% 1026 
Washington Post 
4/15--5/3 11% 2.2% 0% 66.9% 19.9% 78 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
5/4--5/19 15.4% 0.8% 0% 66.7% 17.1% 113 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
5/20--6/3 18.7% 2.5% 2.1% 62.3% 14.4% 135 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
6/4--6/20 25.7% 1.4% 0.8% 59.2% 12.8% 477 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
Total 21.8% 1.7% 1% 59.8 15.7% 803 
Los Angeles Times 
4/15--5/3 2% 2% 1% 73.3% 21.7% 49 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
5/4--5/19 3.8% 1.4% 0.5% 70.2% 24.1% 175 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
5/20--6/3 14.3% 0.8% 1.1% 72.1% 11.7% 224 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
6/4--6/20 27.2% 1.1% 5% 58.7% 12.5% 456 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------- --------
Total 19.6% 1% 0.6% 64.1% 14.7% 904 
========================================================== 
* This symbol includes Communist China, Beijing regime, 
red China, Deng's regime, Chinese Communists, Chinese 
Communist regime, and the Chinese totalitarianism. 
** PRC: People's Republic of China 
*** Entries are numbers of paragraphs. Paragraphs with no 
symbols are excluded. 
The first part of Table VIII shows how The New York 
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Times used different symbols to represent China in the entire 
research period. 
Basically speaking, the percentage of use of "PRC" and 
"Mainland China" did not change from the percentage in the 
pre-movement period (compared to Table VII). But the 
percentage of ideological symbols increased to 10.7% before 
the Chinese government used army troops to retake Tiananmen 
Square on June 4, 1989. After violence occurred, the use of 
ideological symbols jumped to 31%, a 25% increase compared 
to the first study period. At the same time, the use of 
"China" dropped from 68.1% in the first study period to 
55.8% in the last study period, a noticeable 12% decrease. 
If compared to the pre-movement period (see Table VII), the 
use of "China" decreased more than 30% at the end of the 
pro-democracy movement. In addition, the use of "Beijing" 
dropped from 23.2% to 9.8%, a 13% decrease. 
A total of 1026 paragraphs in The New York Times were 
coded. The findings show that "Communist China" (including 
all other ideological symbols) was used 20% of the time, 
"China" was used 63% of the time, and "Beijing" 
was used 14% of the time. Compared to the pre-movement 
period, The New York Times increased by ten times the use of 
ideological symbols to represent China. 
The result seems to show a negative change in the image 
of China, in the perception of The New York Times. Also, 
the negative change in the image of China seems to be 
supported by the findings of decrease in using general 
symbols like "China" and "Beijing." 
The second part of Table VIII shows symbolic 
representations used in Washington Post to refer to China. 
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The percentage of using ideological symbols in 
Washington Post increased steadily from 11% and 15.4% before 
martial law was declared to 25.7% after violence took place 
in Beijing. The increase is over 25% if compared to the 
pre-movement period, which is 0%. At the same time, the use 
of general symbols, "China" and "Beijing," dropped from 
66.9% to 59.8% and from 19.9% to 12.8% respectively. 
A total of 803 paragraphs are coded from Washington 
Post, and findings show that an average of 21.8% use of 
ideological symbols, 75.5% use of general symbols ("China" 
and "Beijing" combined). 
A comparison with the pre-movement findings (see Table 
VII) shows that, in Washington Post, the use of ideological 
symbols increased 25% and the use of general symbols 
("China" and "Beijing") decreased more than 30% over the 
time. 
This finding seems to indicate a negative change in the 
image of China took place during the pro-democracy movement, 
especially after army troops cleared the Tiananmen Square by 
force on June 4, 1989. 
The use of other symbols did not show much change 
throughout the research period. 
The third part of Table VIII illustrates findings of 
symbolic representations of China used in Los Angeles 
Times. 
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Los Angeles Times used relatively fewer ideological 
symbols before martial law was imposed in Beijing (3.8%). 
After declaration of martial law in Beijing, the use of 61 
ideological symbols increased rapidly to 14% and reached 27% 
after violence took place in Beijing. 
The use of general symbols, "China" and "Beijing," 
decreased from 73% to 58.7% and 21.7% to 12.5% respectively. 
There is no significant change in the use of other symbols 
("PRC," and "Mainland China"). 
A total of 904 paragraphs are coded from Los Angeles 
Times in the entire research period. Findings show 19.6% 
use of ideological symbols and 78.8% use of general symbols 
("China" and "Beijing" combined). 
If the above findings are compared with the findings in 
the pre-movement period (Table III), the use of ideological 
symbols in Los Angeles Times increased 22%, from 5% to 27%. 
And the use of general symbol (China) decreased dramatically 
from 85% in the pre-movement period to 58.7% in the last 
study period. 
Findings regarding the use of symbolic representations 
of China in Los Angeles Times seems to confirm the findings 
about the other two newspapers' use of symbolic 
representations of China. Findings on using symbolic 
61 
representations of China in Los Angeles Times, like in the 
other two newspapers, seems to show a negative change in the 
image of China during the time of the Chinese pro-democracy 
movement in 1989, especially after the Chinese government 
used army troops to regain control of the situation in the 
capital on June 4, 1989. 
Finally, Table 4 (post-movement} is presented to show 
the use of symbolic representations of China two months 
after the pro-democracy movement in China. 
TABLE IX 
IMAGE OF CHINA -- 8/6/89 to 8/19/89 
========================================================== 
Communist* PRC** Mainland China Beijing N*** 
China China 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------ -------- -----
N.Y.Times 1.4% 1.1% 1.5% 83.1% 12.9% 56 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------ -------- -----
Wash.Post 7.5% 3.5% 0% 58.7% 30.3% 83 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------ -------- -----
L.A.Times 4.4% 0% 0% 71.7% 23.9% 36 
--------- ---------- ----- --------- ------ -------- -----
Total 4.4% 1.5% 0.5% 71.2% 22.4% 175 
========================================================== 
* This symbol includes Communist China, Beijing regime, 
red China, Deng's regime, Chinese Communists, Chinese 
Communist regime, and Chinese totalitarianism. 
** PRC: People's Republic of China 
***Entries are number of paragraphs. Paragraphs with no 
symbols were excluded. 
In Table IX, the use of ideological symbols dropped an 
average of 15%, from 20% after martial law to 4.4%. The use 
of general symbols in all three newspapers increased an 
equal percentage, from 75% to 95% ("China" and "Beijing" 
combined}. 
Findings in Table IX (post-movement period) indicate 
that all three newspapers dramatically decreased their use 
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of ideological symbols and increased their use of general 
symbols to refer to China. Although the percentage of using 
all symbolic representations of China have not returned to 63 
what they used to be in the pre-movement period, the 
fluctuation is significant enough to show the dramatic ups 
and downs of using symbolic representations of China in the 
three newspapers during the time of the Chinese pro-
democracy movement in 1989. 
Findings of the present research seems to suggest 
three things: 1) all three newspapers increased their 
coverage of events in China dramatically during the Chinese 
pro-democracy movement from April 15, 1989 to June 20, 1989; 
2) the three top officials in the Chinese government were 
perceived as losing power, except one period in which the 
party leader Zhao Ziyang was seen as gaining power and 
another period in which Deng Xiaoping was viewed as gaining 
power; 3) the image of China changed in the negative way all 
along, especially after the Chinese government used military 
troops to regain control in the capital. 
The next chapter contains conclusion of the present 
research and implications for future research in this field. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION/IMPLICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The present research is an attempt to shed some light 
on how some of the leading u.s. newspapers portrayed the 
1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement. The total research 
period covers six months, from early Feb. 1989 to mid Aug. 
1989, including the pretest period (pre-movement and post-
movement). 
This study focuses mainly on three aspects regarding 
how the Chinese pro-democracy movement was portrayed by some 
of the leading U.S. newspapers. The first part of interest 
concerns how much attention the pro-democracy movement 
received from the three leading newspapers in the United 
States. The second aspect regards the power struggle on the 
top level of the Chinese government in the perception of the 
three u.s. newspapers. The last section of research focuses 
on the change in the image of China in the perception of the 
three u.s. newspapers during and right after the Chinese pro-
democracy movement in 1989. 
These three aspects of interest were developed into 
three research questions on the basis of literature review. 
Content analysis was employed as the research method to 
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explore the three research questions. Three leading u.s. 
newspapers were selected for analysis (The New York Times, 
Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times). Each newspaper was 
treated with the same research method and all news articles 
were analysed and coded. The data collection sheets were 
all predesigned and copied before the start of actual data 
collection. Findings on the three research questions are 
presented by using presentation tables (see the previous 
chapter). 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In all three newspapers, a division seems to exist 
between the first two research periods (before martial law 
was imposed in Beijing on May 20, 1989) and the last two 
periods (from May 21, 1989 to June 20, 1989) in terms of how 
much front-page space was used in each newspaper to cover the 
Chinese pro-democracy movement. Before martial law was 
declared in Beijing on May 20, 1989, the rise of the front-
page coverage in The New York Times was gradual, from 6.8% to 
12.9%. The Washington Post reached 13.9%, the highest in the 
first two study periods. The Los Angeles Times saw an 
increase from 6.3% to 11.2%. 
In the third study period, the percentage of front-page 
coverage in all three u.s. newspapers jumped dramatically. 
The New York Times saw a rise of 9.4% from its previous 
12.9%. The percentage of front-page space in Washington 
65 
Post reached 25.9% from its previous 13.9%. The Los Angele 
Times more than doubled its previous percentage of 11.2% and 
reached 23.2%, highest in the third study period. In the 
last study period (June 4, 1989 -June 20, 1989), Los 
Angeles Times used 32.9% of its front-page space to cover 
the events and activities in China. In the same study 
period, the percentage of front-page space in both The New 
York Times and Washington Post did not see much fluctuation 
except that the percentage in Los Angeles Times rose another 
9.7%. 
In all three newspapers, front-page coverage of events 
in China began to dwindle after June 13, 1989, one week 
after the Chinese authorities used troops to retake 
Tiananmen Square from demonstrators who occupied the square 
for more than one month. Two months after the Chinese 
government gained total control of the situation, all three 
newspapers dropped their front-page coverage on events in 
China to less than 1%, though they all did some follow-up 
reporting in their inside pages. 
Power struggle at the top level of the Chinese 
government began to attract the attention of the three 
u.s. newspapres after the May 4th Movement anniversary, 
especially during the time when Gorbachev visited China in 
mid-May, 1989. The focus of intense power struggle within 
the Chinese government was mainly on the top three officials 
on the list, Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Li Peng. The 
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rest of the Chinese officials received relatively less 
attention. This finding seems to indicate two things: 
first, all three newspapers were cautious when they were 
trying to surmise what was going on in the chaotic situation 
in Beijing; second, not very much was known about what role 
the other four officials (see Table V) were playing in the 
power struggle, important as they were behind the scene. 
None of the three newspapers was consistent in its 
reports as to who was winning the power struggle before 
\ 
military foree was used by the Chinese government to regain 
control of the situation in Beijing on June 4, 1989. One 
reporter said that rumors were dominant at the time. The 
situation in China was so chaotic and confusing that many 
news reports were merely based on hearsay and even on pure 
rumors. It was often the case during that period of time 
that one news story predicted that Li peng was losing the 
power struggle and soon would be thrown out as a scapegoat, 
and then, another story in the next day's paper predicted 
just the opposite. 
Overall, the power of the three key Chinese officials 
was seen as waning. Due to the confusion in China at that 
time, it was awfully difficult for anybody to say for sure 
who would eventually win the struggle for power to rule 
China. However, The New York Times saw the party leader 
Zhao Ziyang as gaining power and the other two, Deng and Li, 
as losing in the first study period (May 5, 1989 -- May 19, 
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1989). The Washington Post viewed Li Peng as winning the 
power struggle. In the second study period (May 20, 1989 
May June 4, 1989), all three top officials were seen as 
losing power. The Washington Post viewed Li Peng as gaining 
power as opposed to the other two in the first study period 
and all three were viewed as losing power in the second 
study period. And Los Angeles Times saw all three top 
officials as losing power in both study periods. 
Power struggle at the top level of the Chinese 
government remained unclear until one week after military 
troops were ordered to clear the demonstrators out of 
Tiananmen Square and Deng and Li were seen on TV 
congratulating army officers on their successful mission. 
The three U.S. newspapers showed a similar pattern in 
using symbols associated with China. There seems a clear-
cut difference between the first three study periods (April 
15, 1989 -- June 3, 1989) and the last one (June 4, 1989 --
June 20, 1989). Before military troops were used in Beijing 
on June 4, 1989, China was often identified as either 
"China" or "Beijing," though the use of ideological symbols 
also increased steadily. After Tiananmen Square was cleared 
by military force, the use of ideological symbols increased 
dramatically. China was frequently identified as "Communist 
China," "Beijing regime," "Chinese Communists," "Red 
China," "monstrous government," "Deng's regime," 
"authoritarian Chinese government," and "the Chinese 
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communist regime." The violent incident in Beijing was 
frequently described as "Beijing crackdown," "military 
assault," "Beijing massacre," "Beijing killings," "Beijing 
bloodbath," "bloody crackdown," and "Beijing incident." The 
percentage of ideological symbols was about the same as the 
time before Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1970 (Chang, 1989). 
Throughout the research period, China's official title 
(People's Republic of China) and its geographical symbol 
(Mainland China) were seldom mentioned. At the same time, 
the use of "Beijing" to refer to China decreased steadily as 
the movement was developing and the power struggle was 
unfolding. Despite the fluctuation in the use of all the 
symbols, the general symbol, "China," was dominant in the 
entire study period. However, a slight decrease in the use 
of "China" was visible after the violent ending of the pro-
democracy movement. 
Two months after the Chinese pro-democracy movement was 
terminated by military force, the amount of use of some 
symbols returned to the pre-movement period. The New York 
Times was in the lead, but the other two newspapers seemed 
to be slow to follow. 
The Washington Post also decreased the percentage of use 
of ideological symbols from 26% (June 4, 1989 -- June 
20, 1989) to 8% (Aug. 6, 1989 --Aug. 19, 1989). It was 
still significantly higher than the percentage in the pre-
movement period, which was 0%. 
While the percentage of using one of the general 
symbols (China) in The New York Times was back to its pre-
movement level, its equivalent in Washington Post decreased 
0.5% from its 59.2% in the last study period. At the same 
time, the use of "Beijing" as China's identity increased 
dramatically. 
As in the other two newspapers, Los Angeles Times 
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saw a big increase in using ideological symbols to represent 
China, especially after military troops cleared the 
demonstrators out of the central square in Beijing. The 
general symbol, "China," decreased steadily throughout the 
research periods, though still dominant as far as the 
percentage goes. Two months after "Beijing Incident," the 
use of all symbolic representations of China was back to the 
pre-movement period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Research findings regarding the first research question 
(How much attention did the three U.S. newspapers give to 
the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement?) indicate dramatic 
increase in news coverage about the pro-democracy movement 
in all three newspapers. Of the three newspapers, Los 
Angeles Times took the lead in both front-page space usage 
and number of front page stories. This conclusion is 
strongly supported by two findings. First, under normal 
circumstances, news coverage about China takes up no more 
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than 1% of the front-page space in the three U.S. newspapers 
(for details, see findings of the pre-movement period on 
page 46 and the post-movement period on page 51). 
During the time of the pro-democracy movement, news 
coverage of events in China increased to an average of 10% 
(for details, see findings in Table III on page 50). Los 
Angeles Times, in the last study period, used 32.9% of its 
front-page space to cover the end of the pro-democracy 
movement (see the last part of Table II on page 48). The 
second supportive finding is that news about China seldom 
gets on the front page of big u.s. newspapers. During the 
time of Chinese pro-democracy movement, a total of 214 
front-page stories were printed in three newspapers together 
(59 stories in The New York Times, 68 stories in Washington 
Post, and 87 stories in Los Angeles Times). Besides, each 
newspaper printed an average of 35 photos on their front 
pages (see Table IIi on page 50). Findings on the first 
research question lead to the conclusion that all three 
u.s. newspapers paid a great deal of attention to events 
related to the Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989. 
Findings on the second research question suggest that 
power struggle on the top level of the Chinese government 
presented some degree of confusion and ambiguity to the u.s. 
newspapers. Almost all news reports about the power 
struggle showed some difficulties in predicting who was 
actually winning the power struggle. Often times Li Peng 
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was seen as losing power and Zhao Ziyang was viewed as 
gaining power before martial law was imposed in Beijing on 
May 20, 1989. The confusion and uncertainty might be 
related to two factors: 1) Power struggle in the Chinese 
government was not public. Instead, political struggle on 
the top level of the Chinese government went on behind 
closed doors and the news media was under tight control of 
the government; 2) Rumors took up a large percentage of the 
news reports at that time. Everyone, including professional 
western journalists inside China and out, had tremendous 
difficulties sorting out truth from falsehood. As a result, 
most news reports were based on hearsay or even on pure 
rumors. All in all, the three newspapers perceived the top 
three Chinese leaders as losing power, except the party 
leader Zhao Ziyang, who was seen as gaining power before 
martial law was imposed in Beijing on May 20, 1989. 
Findings on the third research question demonstrate 
that the image of China changed negatively during the pro-
democracy movement, especially after army troops used force 
to clear Tiananmen Square which was occupied by 
demonstrators from late April until early June, 1989. The 
negative change in the image of China is reflected by the 
use of symbolic representations of China in the three 
newspapers. The use of ideological symbols increased from 
6.4% to 31.2% in The New York Times, from 11% to 25.7% in 
Washington Post, and from 2% to 27.2% in Los Angeles Times. 
72 
Overall, the increase in the use of ideological symbols 
is over 15% in the three newspapers from the first study 
period to the last. At the same time, the use of non-
ideological symbols ("China"/"Beijing") decreased from 
68.1%/23.2% to 55.8%/9.8% in The New York Times, from 66.9%/ 
19.9% to 59.2%/12.8% in Washington Post, and from 73.3%/ 
21.7% to 58.7%/12.5% in Los Angeles Times during the entire 
pro-democracy movement in 1989. 
The use of China's official title, the People's 
Republic of China, did not see much change in all four 
research periods (see Table VIII on page 57 for details). 
Two months after June 4, 1989, the use of all symbolic 
representations of China returned to the level in the 
pretest period, though the use of ideological symbolc was 
still a little high with an average of 4.4% (see Table IX on 
page 61). 
On the basis of research findings, it may be concluded 
that the image of China, in the perception of the three u.s. 
newspapers, changed negatively during and right after the 
Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989. 
LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATONS 
The present research is limited to three of the leading 
U.S. newspapers. The findings of this study, therefore, may 
not be applicable to other printed media or other means of 
mass media, like TV or radio. Weaver, Porter and Evans 
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(1982) conducted longitudinal research (1972-1981) on 
foreign news coverage on u.s. network television. One of 
their findings showed significant decline in the volume of 
news time devoted to stories from Asia. The discussion part 
of the research provided the following statement: 
It is conceivable, of course, that a foreign 
event of substantial prominence could occur 
which would temporarily elevate the amount of 
foreign content offered. However, support for 
this speculation was not readily apparent 
(Weaver, Porter, and Evans, 1984). 
With more facilities, experience, and research means, 
future research should expand and include U.S. network 
television as research data and see if the findings would 
support the above statement. 
The present study yielded findings which support the 
above speculation in the sense that the amount of foreign 
news content increased dramatically in the three u.s. 
newspapers during the time when the Chinese pro-democracy 
movement took place in China. Future research should 
attempt to address this aspect in the field of 
telecommunication. 
Mass communication, especially television and radio 
broadcasting, have a strong impact on the perception of the 
general public towards any given issue. Perception of the 
American public about China might have changed in many ways 
during and after the Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989. 
George Skelton stated on the front page of Los Angeles Times 
that, 
The high regard Americans had for China only 
three months ago has turned bitterly sour in 
the wake of the Communist regime's bloody 
suppression of pro-democracy demonstrator, 
according to The Times Poll. In a dramatic 
turnaround, three-fourths of the American 
public now has an unfavorable "overall opinion 
of China," the poll found. In sharp contrast, 
three-fourths of Americans held a favorable 
opinion in March (Skelton, Los Angeles Times, 
June 18, 1989, Part I, p.1). 
According to the findings of the present study, the 
image of China, as seen in the press, changed negatively 
during and after the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement. 
Given the fact that news media affect the perception of the 
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public, it is speculated that the perception of the American 
public about China changed negatively during and right after 
the Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989. However, the 
present study only provides support for this speculation in 
terms of u.s. newspapers. The effect of television and 
other means of mass communication on the American public 
remains an issue for the future research. 
Again, the present study only addressed the reaction of 
three u.s. newspapers towards the Chinese pro-democracy 
movement in 1989. It is likely that other means of mass 
communication portrayed the pro-democracy movement 
similarly. Additional research should reuse or modify the 
research questions in this study to examine and provide 
support for this speculation. In addition, findings in the 
future could be used to assess the difference and similarity 
between printed media and other means of mass communication 
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on the issue of any given foreign event of prominence. 
It is important to note that this study addressed only 
questions regarding how the three u.s. newspapers portrayed 
the Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989. All other means 
of U.S. news media and effect of mass media on the American 
public are beyond the scope of this study. This limition 
makes it impossible to draw conclusions generalizable to 
other aspects of mass communication. The findings of this 
study suggest that high possibilities exist that other means 
of mass communication would produce similar results if 
future research is conducted by a similar research method 
with similar research questions. However, only when future 
research is conducted in a broader sense could we assertain 
such speculation. 
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